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Conventional epidemiological studies of infections spreading through trade net-
works, e.g. via livestock movements, generally show that central large-size
holdings (hubs) should be preferentially surveyed and controlled in order to
reduce epidemic spread. However, epidemiological strategies alone may not
be economically optimal when costs of control are factored in together with
risks of market disruption from targeting core holdings in a supply chain.
Using extensive data on animal movements in supply chains for cattle and
swine in France, we introduce a method to identify effective strategies for pre-
venting outbreaks with limited budgets while minimizing the risk of market
disruptions. Our method involves the categorization of holdings based on pos-
ition along the supply chain and degree of market share. Our analyses suggest
that trade has a higher risk of propagating epidemics through cattle networks,
which are dominated by exchanges involving wholesalers, than for swine. We
assess the effectiveness of contrasting interventions from the perspectives of reg-
ulators and the market, using percolation analysis. We show that preferentially
targeting minor, non-central agents can outperform targeting of hubs when the
costs to stakeholders and the risks of market disturbance are considered. Our
study highlights the importance of assessing joint economic–epidemiological
risks in networks underlying pathogen propagation and trade.1. Introduction
Trade is crucial for the economy, but can also drive infectious disease trans-
mission, sustaining epidemics locally and promoting potentially long-distance
introductions (e.g. [1]). Examples of markets that can contribute to epidemic out-
breaks include trade of livestock such as cattle [2], swine [3], and sheep [4];
prostitution [5]; and airline transportation [6]. In the epidemiological literature,
the contact structure underpinning pathogen spread through trading contacts is
usually described using network models (e.g. [7]). In such models, holdings
(e.g. farms) are represented by nodes that are interconnected by links that rep-
resent exchanges among holdings (e.g. movement of animals). In the past
decade, network-based models have become increasingly popular as means to
achieve a threefold objective: (i) to describe the contact structure spanned by
such markets (e.g. [1]), (ii) to assess the epidemic risk factors at the scale of
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control strategies (e.g. [9]). In particular, network analyses have
proved useful in identifying super-spreading holdings, usually
referred to as ‘hubs’, that should be preferentially subjected to
trade restrictions in order to prevent and mitigate epidemics.
The disruption of such core market players, however, can
cause economic shocks, a downside, which, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been considered in network-based, data-
driven epidemiological studies. Here, we consider the key,
but yet unaddressed question of evaluating the trade-off
between the commercial efficiencies of trade routes and their
vulnerabilities as routes for the transmission of economically
damaging pathogens. We investigate this trade-off for live-
stock-exchange markets in France, for which we have access
to extensive data.
The construction of network models of livestock markets
requires the use of records of animal movements. In the Euro-
pean Union (EU), for instance, exhaustive tracing of livestock
movement is available inmany nationallymaintained datasets,
originally for cattle since the 1990s (Council Directive 92/102/
EECof 27November 1992 on the identification and registration
of animals) and more recently for swine (Council Directive
2008/71/EC of 15 July 2008 on the identification and regis-
tration of pigs). In other countries, data with such levels of
detail may not be available because, for example, the data
may have been aggregated to comply with privacy laws, or
routine data collection may not be implemented at the farm
level. The architecture of animal movements is often extremely
rich and can be described by more or less simple network
models depending on the objective of the epidemiological
study [7]. In some cases, livestock-exchange network models
can account for: more than one type of node (e.g. farms
versus purely commercial holdings; e.g. [10]), direction of
exchange (animals are essentially shipped from selling to
buying holdings; e.g. [11]), weight of shipments (when the
number of animals shipped in one go varies; e.g. [1]), and
dynamical aspects (the shipment of animals occurs at certain
points in time; e.g. [7]). It follows that empirical livestock-
exchange networks exhibit key features shared by many
complex networks, namely they are multipartite, directed,
weighted and dynamic. Recent studies with network analyses
of livestock markets provide significant information on demo-
graphic aspects and vulnerability to pathogen transmission in
cattle and pig markets in several countries, especially where
detailed data are routinely collected, including cattle, for
example in the UK, Sweden, France and Italy [1,3,8,10] for
cattle and Sweden, France and Germany [3,12,13], for pigs.
There is increasing concern for the vulnerability of livestock
systems with very large-scale connectedness, for example, as
a result of open livestock trade among national markets such
as the trade among the 27 member states of the EU [14],
which includes movement of cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, poultry
and horses. There have also been attempts at assessing the
accuracy of epidemiological predictions in cases where
detailed records of livestock movement are not available [15].
Various determinants of the risk of transmission of infec-
tion, and hence disease, can be calculated depending on the
features included in a given network model. These determi-
nants of risk range from the total number of commercial
partners per agent (the total degree, e.g. [10]), the number of
premises that can be reached through successive temporally
compatible links [3] and the ability of each holding to preserve
its commercial partners over time (an ability referred to as‘loyalty’ [16]). In the general case, anymeasure of network cen-
trality for a given holding can be used as an indicator of the
corresponding risk of contagion. By identifying potentially
highly contagious nodes, network analyses can inform the
effective prevention and control of infectious disease trans-
mission. It is general wisdom that such infectious ‘hubs’
should be targeted preferentially by the regulator (the public
authorities enforcing health policy, which sometimes pre-
cludes such hubs from exchanging) in order to prevent and
mitigate infectious disease outbreaks in exchange network
systems [17–20].
While the implementation of trade restrictions on key large-
size holdings could be effective in mitigating epidemic out-
breaks, it is often prohibitively costly to regulators and has
potentially severe economic impact on markets. Specifically,
the disruption of core market players through intensive
preventive measures can cause economic shock and render
such strategies inappropriate [21]. The promising alternative
of combining evaluation of economic and epidemiological
risks, however, remains a key gap in the literature [22]; this
is so, despite recent efforts mostly confined to theoretical
studies based on models coupling epidemiological dynamics
and economic aspects related to trade [23]. This gap is also
related to the absence of well-established measures of cost
effectiveness for managing livestock diseases [24].
Because the agents that are central to the market are also
likely to act as sources for epidemic spread, we expect that in
general there will be a strong association between economic
and epidemiological risks, some of which may be negative
(inverse) associations. In this study, we aim to identify efficient
strategies for preventing epidemics with minimal disruption to
markets and limited cost to the stakeholders such as regulators
and business owners. We introduce a market-based categoriz-
ation for aggregating the holdings based on economic as well
as structural network summaries, namely position along the
supply chain and market share or leadership. To study the econ-
omic–epidemiological implications of our categorization, we
analyse twodatasets recording cattle and swine livestockmove-
ment in France during 2005–2009 and 2010, respectively (§2).
We show that the market categories that we propose describe
livestock exchange intuitively and provide insights on the
underlying trading patterns (§3.1). Using these categories,
which are easy to implement because they are empirically
defined, we evaluate the joint economic–epidemiological
risks of epidemic outbreak and associated regulatory measures
(§3.2). We consider both the regulator’s and the market’s stand-
points and evaluate the effectiveness of different preventive
strategies that target agents in selected market categories
(§3.3). Both static and dynamical preventive strategies are
explored, whether based on real-time or past data. We con-
clude by summarizing our most important results and by
highlighting some perspectives for future work (§4).
The principal contribution of our study stems from
adopting data-driven epidemiological and economic stand-
points in order to evaluate control strategies against
pathogen spread in livestock trade markets. Our study also
contributes to the literature on network epidemiology by
identifying how the choice of optimal outbreak control strat-
egies may depend on the system considered (here cattle and
swine livestock exchanges). Specifically, the optimal strategy
identified does not necessarily rely on preferentially targeting
hubs, despite the latter being often regarded as an evidently
best approach.
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2.1. Trade networks and livestock exchange
Describing livestock exchange from a market-centric perspective
requires a preliminary exposition of core concepts, at the crossroad
of economics and network theory. After a brief introduction to
markets, we present the livestock-exchange data that we analyse
as trade networks.
2.1.1. Understanding markets from a network-centric perspective
As a first approximation, a market can be formally described as a
network composed of economic agents (e.g. individuals,
businesses or sovereign states) in interaction [25,26]. From a net-
work perspective, an agent corresponds to a node or vertex
interactingwith other nodes through links or edges. From an econ-
omic perspective, an agent is an entity that pursues its own
interests through some kind of economic optimization. Agents
have generally divergent interests resolved through exchanges
and price definition [27].
Based on [28],we define some core concepts to describemarkets
and their influence on epidemics. A market is made of supplying
agents, i.e. suppliers, and demanding agents, i.e. demanders. Agents
that are both supplying and demanding correspond to wholesalers.
Agents interact during transactions by exchanging goods that can
lead to disease transmission, where a transaction is a delivery
from a supplier to a demander. Trade flow is the number of products
(e.g. animals) traded from a supplier to a demander per unit time.
Provided that trade is the only route for transmission, trade flow
can be interpreted as the epidemiological contact rate (number of
transactions per time unit) weighted by contact intensity (number
of products exchanged per transaction).
Since the exchange of animals occurs from suppliers to deman-
ders but often not in the reverse direction, and since different
numbers of animals are shipped per transaction, we say that
exchanges are directed and weighted. It follows that trade flow has
a direction, e.g. we can dissociate in- and out-trade flows. We can
also calculate the total-trade flow, i.e. the sum of the in- and out-
trade flows. Hence, markets are described by directed and
weighted networks. Moreover, since exchanges occur at precise
points in time, markets form dynamical networks. Although more
realistic, dynamical networks are harder to analyse than static net-
works (obtained, for instance, by aggregating interactions over
time). In particular, the probability of outbreak emergence and
the resulting impact on a trade network are more difficult to
assess in time-varying than in static networks [29]. Here, we
consider both types of networks.
2.1.2. French livestock-exchange data described as
trade networks
We analyse and compare trade networks derived from two
datasets recording livestock exchange in France: the BDNI for
cattle (managed by the French Ministry in charge of Agriculture
(FMA)) over years 2005–2010, and BDPorc for swine (managed
by the French professional union BDPorc) in 2010. Each dataset
details movements of animals occurring in France among all econ-
omic agents involved in the supply chain, from strictly breeding
farms to slaughterhouses with various categories of structural
wholesalers in between (e.g. breeding–fattening farms, strictly fat-
tening farms, dealers). Data on imports and exports are also
available. Traceability is imposed by the regulator at different
scales: on individual animals in the case of cattle, and on batches
(sets of animals shipped from a seller to a demander during a trans-
action) in the case of swine. Hence, we extract individual-level
transactions directly from the cattle dataset. Moreover, we recon-
struct individual-level transactions for pigs based on a simple
matching process (see the electronic supplementary material, sec-
tion B.2 of [28], for details).Our core network-based analyses are carried out at the
microeconomic business scale, i.e. agricultural holdings, as far
as national livestock exchange is concerned. The datasets allow
us to distinguish three groups of holdings: farms, i.e. agents
aiming to produce livestock; trading agents such as assembling
centres, i.e. agents aiming to exchange livestock; and the rest of
the world, a single entity aggregating all agents located outside
of France, which we use to assess the importance of international
restrictions on trade, as e.g. might occur in the case of a major
outbreak. Following the epidemiological literature [3], we neglect
slaughterhouses and movements to slaughterhouses from our
analyses since including these movements would underestimate
the risk of transmission associated with farms. However, we do
include foreign movements to and from France as they can con-
tribute to disease introduction, further dispersion on large
geographical scales and major economic disruptions. Though
we explored several temporal descriptions of networks (see the
electronic supplementary material), all analyses presented in
the main text are carried out on static networks aggregating
transactions at the yearly scale for the sake of simplicity.
2.2. Market-centric categorization of economic agents
for representing the trade networks
We introduce a generic categorization of economic agents appli-
cable to a variety of markets including livestock exchange. We
sort agents according to two types of market summaries: position
along the supply chain and market leadership, and then use these cat-
egories to define market categories. Let T ¼ ½t1, t2 represent the
period of time over which we aggregate the transactions. We
then use these aggregates to calculate the following summaries.
2.2.1. Position along the supply chain: flow polarity
Position along the supply chain is given by the overall direction
of trade flow, that we quantify by a summary referred to as flow
polarity and denoted fpa, and that is given for any agent a by the
difference of its in- and out-trade flows divided by its total-trade
flow over a particular time period T :
½flow polarity of agent aðT Þ ¼ fpaðT Þ
¼ ½in-trade flow to aðT Þ  ½out-trade flow from aðT Þ½in-trade flow to aðT Þ þ ½out-trade flow from aðT Þ ,
ð2:1Þ
where [in-trade flow to a] (T Þ ¼ fina ðT Þ ¼
P
ifiaðT Þ and [out-trade
flow from a] (T Þ ¼ fouta ðT Þ ¼
P
jfajðT Þ, with fijðT Þ the trade
flow from i to j over T and where sums are over all nodes exchan-
ging with a over the same period. By construction, 1  fpa  1
(2.1) and fpa can take any value between these two extremes. In
order to build discrete classes of agents based on flow polarity,
we introduce an empirical threshold e . 0 which can take either
predetermined values or be set equal to percentiles of a given dis-
tribution. Hence, agents a for which fpa , e, fpa [ ½e, e and
fpa . e correspond to suppliers, wholesalers and demanders, respect-
ively. Flow polarity is an extension of the concept of hierarchy
[30,31] to weighted and dynamical networks.
2.2.2. Market leadership: flow share
Following marketing studies [32], we use flow share, i.e. the rela-
tive trade flow, to quantify market leadership. For any agent a, flow
share, denoted fsa, is defined as its total-trade flow over time
period T divided by the sum of total-trade flow for all agents
over T :
½flow share of agent aðT Þ ¼ fsaðT Þ
¼ ½in-trade flow to aðT Þ þ ½out-trade flow from aðT Þ½total in-trade flow] þ ½total out-trade flow] ðT Þ ,
ð2:2Þ
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½total out-trade flow ¼ FoutðT Þ ¼Pafouta ðT Þ, with sums over
all active agents over T : Flow conservation implies that
FinðT Þ ¼ FoutðT Þ: By definition, 0  fsa  1 (2.2) andP
a fsa ¼ 1, where the sum is over all active agents in the
market during T : Similarly to flow polarity, we introduce two
empirical thresholds d1, d2 . 0 which can take either predeter-
mined values or be set equal to percentiles of a given
distribution. Agents a for which fsa , d1, fsa [ ½d1, d2 and
fsa . d2 are denoted nichers, followers and leaders, respectively.rg
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flow share summaries
Market categories are defined based on a two-dimensional indi-
cator (fpa, fsa), i.e. by the combination of position along the
supply chain and market leadership: suppliers-nichers (SN),
suppliers-followers (SF), suppliers-leaders (SD), wholesalers-
nichers (WN), wholesalers-followers (WF), wholesalers-leaders
(WL), demanders-nichers (DN), demanders-followers (DF) and
demanders-leaders (DL). In addition to the categorization in
3  3 classes (with respect to the above definitions for fpa and
fsa), finer grids can be adopted for more detailed analysis.2.3. Elaboration, choice and evaluation of targeted
control strategies
Based on the categorization of agents that we have introduced, we
consider preventive strategies that involve preferential targeting of
agents belonging to certainmarket categories.We evaluate generic
forms of interventions for outbreak control. Specific practical
examples of these interventions include preferential surveillance
and vaccination of the agents that are deemedmost at risk.We pro-
ceed in three steps: firstly, we elaborate a general class of strategies
preferentially targeting agents belonging to specific market cat-
egories; secondly, we identify meaningful targeting strategies
by assessing which agents are most at risk according to network-
based summaries of economic and epidemiological risks; thirdly,
we evaluate indirectly, from an economic–epidemiological
perspective, how selected strategies influence systemic risk.2.3.1. Preferential targeting of agents in specific market
categories
Let N denote the number of agents involved in at least one trade
event during the time interval T : The fraction Fn ¼ n/N of n
agents to be targeted is chosen according to strategy S (scenario
denoted ðFn; SÞ), which ranks each agent a from 1 to N according
to the decreasing values of a rank function, denoted Rðfpa, fsaÞ,
and based on the market categories as defined by fp and fs. We
define Rðfpa, fsaÞ as the product of functions RfpðfpaÞ and
RfsðfsaÞ:
Rðfpa, fsaÞ ¼ RfpðfpaÞ RfsðfsaÞ, with
RfpðfpaÞ ¼ ½2 ðfpa þ 1Þz
suppliers ½fpa þ 1z
demanders
and RfsðfsaÞ ¼ ½maxðfsÞ  fsaz
nichers ½fsaz
leaders
,
9>>=
>>;
ð2:3Þ
where zsuppliers, zdemanders, znichers and zleaders  0 are fixed par-
ameters representing the preferences of the regulator for
targeting specific market categories. As an example, wholesaling
leaders are surveyed preferentially when we set: zsuppliers ¼
zdemanders. 0, znichers¼ 0 and zleaders. 0. In the case when
two or more agents take the same value of R, we choose their rela-
tive orders uniformly at random.Note that the variability resulting
from this ranked ordering is weak, as confirmed by assessments of
each strategy over 100 random replicate targeting for both datasets.2.3.2. Identification of specific targeted control strategies
To choose meaningful preventive strategies, i.e. to set a priori
appropriate values for zsuppliers, zdemanders, znichers and zleaders in
(2.3), we calculate various risk indicators per agent per market
category. We specify for each indicator whether it quantifies an
economic risk, an epidemiological risk or economic–epidemiological
risks. An economic risk is the risk of market disruptions caused
by the failure of an agent. An epidemiological risk is the risk for
a healthy agent to become contaminated and/or the risk of an
infected agent to further transmit an infection to other agents.
Economic-epidemiological risks are combined risks. In identifying
optimal interventions, we are specially interested in strategies
that minimize both economic and epidemiological risks.
First, we consider three risk indicators at the agent level: flow
polarity, flow share and trade flow (defined in §2.1 and 2.2).
We consider flow polarity is a measure of joint economic–
epidemiological risks, flow share constitutes a measure of
economic risk and trade flow quantifies epidemiological risk
(although the relationships between these measures are subject
to economic and epidemiological reinterpretations) [28,33,34].
We also calculate, for each market category, the values of two
additional indicators of epidemiological risk that are well docu-
mented in the network epidemiology literature: the proportion of
agents belonging to the largest strongly connected component (LSCC)
and the average betweenness centrality. The LSCC is the largest sub-
network of agents for which a directed path exists from any other
agent in the subnetwork. The betweeness centrality of a node is
the fraction of shortest paths that passes through this node (see
electronic supplementary material, section A.1 for details).
2.3.3. Evaluation of the targeted control strategies using multi-
criteria decision analyses
To evaluate targeting strategies, we carry out multi-criteria decision
analyses (MCDA) from an economic–epidemiological perspective.
The MCDA aim to find optimal strategies for reaching one or mul-
tiple objectives with minimal efforts, potentially considering
multiple objectives and types of effort simultaneously [35]. The
capacity of a strategy for mitigating a disease is measured through
prevention-effectiveness criteria, while the effort needed for reaching
a given effectiveness is measured through prevention cost criteria,
where all criteria are to be defined. An optimal strategy is one that
maximizes prevention effectiveness with minimal efforts. The strat-
egies considered in this studyare implementedby the regulatorwho
decides to target certain agents preferentially. In practice, the cost of
implementing control measures may fall on the regulator, the
business owners or other stakeholders of the market. However,
the perception of what is an optimal strategy is subjective. We
hence consider two complementarypoints of viewwhencomparing
control strategies: the regulator’s and the market’s.
2.3.3.1. Prevention effectiveness: derivation from the LSCC
We define prevention effectiveness as the benefit to the market
stakeholders of implementing a preventive strategy, for instance,
the losses averted by avoiding an epidemic. The proportion of
agents belonging to the LSCC is a standard epidemiological
proxy to assess both the probability of disease invasion and the
epidemic final size [12,36]. Following node percolation exper-
iments [17], we measure the prevention effectiveness of a given
strategy S when targeting a proportion Fn of agents by the relative
decrease in the LSCC size of the network aggregated over the time
period T :
½prevention effectivenessðFn; SÞðT Þ
¼ ½relative decrease in the LSCC size] ðFn; SÞðT Þ,
¼ 1 ½number of agents remaining in the LSCC ðFn; SÞðT Þ½number of agents in the LSCC without prevention ðT Þ :
ð2:4Þ
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also use, in the electronic supplementary material, the average
infection chain as an alternative proxy for prevention effectiveness
[2,3,11]. In contrast with the LSCC, the average infection chain has
the advantage of taking into account the sequence of dates when
exchanges occur over time period T (and hence of considering
only temporally compatible paths between agents). However,
because of the considerable computation time required, calculation
of the average infection chain is only performed for rather
small networks. We also explore the influence of postponing
the implementation of a given strategy S (see the electronic
supplementary material, section A.2 for more details).
2.3.3.2. Prevention costs: relative costs to the regulator and
market distortions
We define multiple prevention costs, as the relative costs to the
regulator and consequentmarket distortions. Relative costs to the regu-
lator are costs incurred by the regulator when, e.g. implementing a
preventive control strategy. Market distortions are potential dama-
ging impacts on the market that result directly or indirectly from
implementation of a preventive control strategy.
First, we detail relative costs to the regulator. When imple-
menting a strategy S over time period T , we assume the
regulator may incur two types of costs: an agent cost and a flow
cost. In common with others [17], though explicitly rather than
implicitly, we assume the agent cost is proportional to Fn for any
strategy S: The flow cost is also expected to increase with Fn but
to be highly variable depending on the underlying strategy S:
Here, in line with [28], we assume the flow cost is proportional
to ðSafsaÞðFn; SÞ (T ), which is the total flow share of the fraction
Fn of agents targeted in strategy S: In practice, since we are inter-
ested in ranking a set of strategies, we measure relative rather than
absolute costs: we hence directly track Fn and ðSafsaÞðFn; SÞ(T ),
which take values in [0,1], as proxies for economic risk.
Second, we specify market distortions. Any preventive strat-
egy implemented by the regulator is expected to cause market
disruptions. Here, by analogy with our market categories, we
consider two types of economic risk proxies to measure disrup-
tions to the market: disruption to the overall flow polarity and
disruption to the overall flow share. Disruption to the overall flow
polarity, denoted mðFn; SÞðT Þ, is measured as the relative
mismatch between overall in- and out-flows:
mðFn;SÞðT Þ
¼ ðF
inðF0;SÞFinðFn;SÞÞðT ÞðFoutðF0;SÞFoutðFn;SÞÞðT Þ
ðFinðF0;SÞFinðFn;SÞÞðT ÞþðFoutðF0;SÞFoutðFn;SÞÞðT Þ

,
ð2:5Þ
where FinðFk; SÞðT Þ and FoutðFk; SÞðT Þ are the total in- and
out-flows distorted when a fraction Fk of agents are targeted
according to strategy S: As specified in §2.2.2, flow conserva-
tion implies FinðF0; SÞðT Þ ¼ FoutðF0; SÞðT Þ: By construction,
mðFn; SÞðT Þ takes values in [0,1]. Disruption to the overall flow
share is assessed by ðSafsaÞðFn; SÞðT Þ, the total flow share targeted
and hence potentially disrupted when a fraction Fn of agents is tar-
geted according to strategy S: Note that the same value of
ðSafsaÞðFn; SÞðT Þ is used as a proxy for two differing quantities:
flow cost (incurred by the regulator while implementing a strategy)
and disruption to the overall flow share (which reflects a particular
market disruption induced by the regulator’s intervention).
2.3.3.3. Practical implementation of the MCDA
Multiple criteria decision analyses are carried out over time
period T , which we set to start in 2009 for cattle and 2010 for
swine. To account for potential delays in the collection of data
necessary to calculate flow polarity fpa (2.1) and flow share fsa
(2.2), we explore two contrasting cases: the real-time scenario orthe deferred scenario, respectively, where the regulator has access
to real-time data or deferred data, respectively, so fpa and fsa
can be calculated based on T or based on T  dt (with dt repre-
senting the delay of data collection), respectively. We set dt ¼ 1
year, a deliberately large value for data collection. For each strat-
egy explored, the relative decrease in the LSCC size is evaluated
at increasing values of Fn. For each value of Fn, we keep track of
the proxy for prevention effectiveness (the relative decrease in
the LSCC size (2.4)), and of the four proxies for prevention
costs: the two relative costs to the regulator (relative agent cost
Fn and flow cost ðSafsaÞðFn; SÞðT Þ); and two measures of
market distortions (disruption to the overall flow polarity
mðFn; SÞðT Þ (2.5) and disruption to the overall flow share
ðSafsaÞðFn; SÞðT Þ).3. Results and discussion
3.1. Analyses and representation of trade networks
using market categories
Considering the French datasets for livestock movements of
cattle and swine, we categorize agents with similar market
characteristics, according to position along the supply chain,
quantified by flow polarity (figure 1a,c), and market leader-
ship, quantified by flow share (figure 1b,d ). Agents with
similar ranks in flow polarity and flow share belong to the
same market category (figure 2a). Since market categories are
relatively invariant over time (electronic supplementary
material, section B.1, figure S1), we focus our subsequent
analyses based on 2009 for cattle and 2010 for swine.
We notice suppliers and demanders are overly represented
in the cattle and swine markets, respectively (figure 1a). Since
demanders act as epidemiological dead-ends, our analyses
suggest that the cattle market is riskier than the swine
market, a result in agreementwith [12]. According to the distri-
bution of flow share, the swinemarket is less scattered than the
cattle market (figure 1b). For instance, the median flow share is
1024.4 in swine in 2010 and only 1026.0 in cattle in 2009, i.e. the
median flow share in the swine market is 40 times larger than
in the cattle market. This indicates a larger economic risk
associated with the failure of a typical swine agent compared
with the failure of a typical cattle agent.
To shed light on the practical meaning of flow polarity
and flow share, we analyse the correspondence between stan-
dard market groups and our market categories (figure 1c,d ).
For cattle, we remark that farms and trading agents corre-
spond to suppliers and wholesalers, while for swine, farms
and trading agents rather correspond to wholesalers-to-
demanders (figure 1c). For both cattle and swine, French
exchanges with the rest of the world essentially correspond
to exports, i.e. the rest of the world acts as a strict demander.
Concerning flow share for cattle and swine, farms and
trading agents correspond to nichers-to-followers and fol-
lowers-to-leaders, respectively (figure 1d ). The rest of the
world represents a considerable flow share (about 13% for
cattle and 4% for swine) and can be described as a major
market leader for both trade systems.
We compare the cattle and swine markets using the market
categories defined in figure 2a. In the cattle market, the pro-
portion of leaders is small, irrespective to the flow polarity.
The most represented market categories are SN and SF,
with no significant difference between nichers and followers.
In the swine market, the largest proportions of agents are in
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Figure 1. Categorization of economic agents: flow polarity and flow share. (a,b) Distributions of flow polarity and flow share in the cattle and swine markets. Flow
polarity and flow share of an economic agent quantify its position along the supply chain and market leadership, respectively. Qualitatively, flow polarity (2.1) can be
used to define suppliers, wholesalers and demanders, categories of agents corresponding to values that are negative, symmetrically distributed about zero, and
positive, respectively. Similarly, flow share (2.2) can be used to define nichers (low values), followers (mid values) and leaders (high values). (c,d ) Distributions
of flow polarity and flow share per group of agents in the cattle and swine markets. Groups are either sets of French farms or trading agents, or a single entity
aggregating all agents located outside of France, namely the rest of the world. Flow polarity and flow share are calculated over year 2009 for cattle and throughout
year 2010 for swine.
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lowers exhibit a polarized activity most of the time. These
distributions are modified when scrutinizing the LSCC.
Indeed, for both cattle and swine, the proportion of agents
belonging to the LSCC increases with increasing flow share
(figure 2b), implying that the epidemiological risk associated
with leaders is larger than that associated with nichers.
This trend is confirmed by the distribution of average
betweenness centrality among market categories (electronic
supplementary material, section B.2, figure S2). For a given
flow share, both risk indicators, i.e. the LSCC and betweeness
centrality, typically have larger values for agents with negli-
gible flow polarity, which suggests that wholesalers are
probably stronger epidemiological drivers than suppliers, a
finding in agreement with the theoretical results reported in
[30,31]. We also notice, in line with [12], that the proportion
of agents belonging to the LSCC is larger in cattle than in
swine, which suggests that there is greater epidemiological
risk associated with trade in cattle markets.
The use of market categories also enables comparison
of connection patterns in the cattle and swine markets(figure 3). In the cattle market, the total-trade flow is relatively
large for the WF and WL categories. Also, exchanges to and
fromwholesalers (irrespective of flow polarity) andwithin cat-
egoriesWFandWL are clearly over-represented in this market,
thus generating structural loops and potentially infectious
feedback. By contrast, there is a larger number of exchanges
in the swine market than in the cattle market that involve
direct transactions from suppliers to demanders, particularly
from SF to DF, which leads to a trading structurewith a limited
number of potentially infectious feedback routes. Again, this
result suggests that the swine market is less prone to epidemic
spread compared with the cattle market.
3.2. Identification of targeted control strategies based
on risk assessment per agent per market category
Particular preventive strategies are selected from preliminary
risk assessments (§2.3.2). By definition, trade flow per capita
increases with flow share for both cattle and swine, implying
larger economic–epidemiological risks per capita associated
with leaders compared to nichers. Flow polarity does not
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Figure 2. Market categories defined according to flow polarity and flow share and used to assess joint economic–epidemiological risks. (a) Proportion of agents in
the whole population that are in each market category, i.e. agents with the given ranges of flow polarity and flow share. (b) Proportion of agents in the LSCC that
are in each market category. The LSCC is a proxy for both the probability of an outbreak and the epidemic final size. The risk of outbreak increases as the number of
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(figure 3). Also note that in cattle, wholesalers have compara-
tively larger trade flows than the other categories. As in
§3.1, this outcome suggests that wholesalers are stronger
epidemiological drivers than suppliers.
At the scale of market categories, WL are more connected
(figure 3), have a larger betweenness centrality (electronic
supplementary material, section B.2) and are more likely to
belong to the LSCC than SN (figure 2). This latter point ren-
ders WL representative both in the cattle and in the swine
markets, although for the swine market WL agents are not
involved in large volumes of trade (figure 3b). The swine
market is driven mainly by trade flows from SF and SL to
DF, which suggests that the epidemiological risk could be
confined to only a few market categories. We therefore
expect the cattle market to be at a greater epidemiological
risk compared with the swine market, a finding in agreement
with the results reported in §3.1 and in a previous study [28].
Taken together, our results corroborate, in agreement
with the literature, that WL appear to act as infectious
super-spreaders. WL, as market leaders, are also associatedwith major economic risks in case of failure. Like WL, SN
can act as infection sources and are associated with epidemio-
logical risk. However, in contrast with WL, SN have minor
market importance and are less likely to induce market dis-
ruptions when disturbed. From a network perspective, WL
(SN) can therefore be described as ‘hubs’ (anti-hubs), i.e.
agents with a large (low) number of links compared with
the average number of links per agent [37]. We therefore
evaluate two contrasting strategies: the preferential targeting
of hubs, i.e. WL, and the preferential targeting of anti-hubs,
i.e. SN. The strategies targeting WL first (SN first) are referred
to as the WL strategies (the SN strategies). In practice, we set
zsuppliers ¼ zdemanders ¼ 1, znichers ¼ 0 and zleaders ¼ 1 in (2.3)
for the WL strategies, and zsuppliers ¼ 1, zdemanders ¼ 0,
znichers ¼ 1 and zleaders ¼ 0 in (2.3) for the SN strategies.
3.3. Evaluation of the targeted control strategies using
multi-criteria decision analyses
Based on the results from the risk assessment (3.2), our
MCDA focus on strategies preferentially targeting WL
SN
SF
SL
WN
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WL
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DF
DL
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WN
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DF
DL
106
105
trade flow 
(animals per year)
107
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Figure 3. Trade networks of the cattle and swine livestock markets (a,b). Data are yearly aggregated (2009 for cattle and 2010 for swine). Each node encompasses
all the agents in each market category, as defined on the 3  3 grid in figure 2. The size of each node is proportional to the yearly aggregated trade flow summed
up over all agents in each market category. Widths and colour intensity of directed links (arrows) are proportional to corresponding yearly aggregated trade flow
from/to each aggregated category, summed up over all the agents in the categories involved in in- or out-movements.
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agents. The relative performances of these strategies are com-
pared for both markets using various criteria (as defined in
§2.3.3).
We start by introducing results from the regulator’s point
of view (i.e. quantifying agent costs and flow costs). WL strat-
egies appear always to be more effective than SN strategies
provided that the overall prevention cost is driven by the frac-
tion of agents targeted (plain black curves in figures 4a,c and
5a,c). Under these conditions, we recover the commonly
accepted wisdom that preferentially targeting the most cen-
tral nodes in a heterogeneous network is the best way
to mitigate an epidemic [17], where centrality of the nodes
is determined by having large betweeness centrality and
probability of belonging to the LSCC.
However, if the overall prevention cost is driven instead by
the fraction of targeted flow, the SN strategies can be moreefficacious than the WL strategies as seen in cattle (plain grey
curves in figure 4a,c) but not in swine (plain grey curves in
figure 5a,c). An example of a strategy driven by the fraction
of targeted flow (total animals to be protected per time unit)
would be an initiative whereby diagnostic tests would be dis-
tributed to farmers purchasing livestock in order to test
biological samples from the animals purchased. This appar-
ently counterintuitive result stems from the structure of the
cattle network (figure 3a) and may not be so surprising:
when applying tests at purchase, it may be better to cover
both a large geographical and topological space (the ‘area’ cov-
ered by a network), i.e. to dispatch a constant number of tests to
a very large number of premises with very small flow shares,
rather than to a very small number of holdings with very
large flow shares.
From the market’s point of view, when targeting agents to
prevent epidemics, the regulator will necessarily induce
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Figure 4. MCDA of contrasting targeted control strategies in the cattle livestock market. MCDA of strategies targeting WL first (a,b, with zsuppliers ¼ 1; zdemanders ¼ 1;
znichers¼ 0; z leaders¼ 1 in (2.3)) and SN first (c,d, with zsuppliers ¼ 1; zdemanders¼ 0; znichers¼ 1; z leaders¼ 0 in (2.3)). For each strategy, the x-axis quantifies
prevention costs, i.e. the relative costs to the regulator (a– c) and relative distortions to the market (b–d ) to reach a given prevention effectiveness against epidemics
as depicted on the y-axis (e.g. the red dotted lines to reach 50% of prevention effectiveness). Prevention effectiveness is measured by the proportion of agents removed
from the LSCC (2.4). Preventive strategies in the cattle market are implemented over year 2009. Market categories are defined either over 2009 (real-time information
available on agents, plain curves) or over 2008 (deferred information available on agents, dashed curves). Each case corresponds to 100 replicate simulations (notice the
weak variability).
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disruptions of the market include shifts in price, removal
and later reintroduction of suppliers and demanders and/
or local and global depletions in supply and demand
stocks. Disruptions can be induced by infection and sub-
sequent eradication of contaminated stock for sanitation or
other preventive measures [28]. At first sight, it seems
impossible to attain an optimal situation where epidemics
are at low risk without affecting the market. Some strategies
appear better than others though: while the SN strategies can
induce fewer distortions than the WL strategies for most
levels of prevention-effectiveness in cattle (figure 4b,d ), the
WL strategies are always the best in swine (figure 5b,d ).
These results suggest that cattle and swine markets, while
both corresponding to heterogeneous livestock-exchange
networks, require differing preventive measures.
Introduction of delays in the collection of data to design
preventive strategies has little effect on our results (dashed
versus plain curves in figures 4 and 5). Our conclusions are
also not affected by the use of an alternative measurement
of prevention effectiveness with an epidemiological riskproxy accounting for the time-varying nature of the network
(i.e. the succession of transactions and hence of network links
over time) nor by the inclusion of time lags in the implemen-
tation of preventive strategies (electronic supplementary
material, section B.3).
Taken together, our results suggest that the WL strategies
are not always the best. In particular for the cattle market,
when costs of prevention are driven by the number of ani-
mals to target, the SN strategies perform better than the
WL strategies.4. Conclusion
Regulators tasked with managing disease outbreaks are
generally constrained by limited resources [38]. Therefore,
prioritizing interventions under limited resources is essential
to achieve effective prevention and control of epidemic
outbreaks. Typical targeted preventive measures include
vaccination of risky agents, and risk-based surveillance
such as blood-tests for identifying cryptic infectious cases,
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Figure 5. MCDA of contrasting targeted control strategies in the swine livestock market. Targeting strategies in the swine market are implemented over year 2010.
Market categories are defined either over year 2010 (real-time information available on agents, plain curves) or over January 2010 (deferred information available on
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markets. Targeted prevention is particularly relevant for a
national regulator aiming to eradicate or control a disease
in order to generate subsequent commercial benefits or to
maintain a disease-free status to satisfy the requirements
of the international animal health code. Acquiring or main-
taining an internationally recognized disease-free status is
associated with major benefits such as capacity to export
livestock and reduction of control burdens. For instance,
according to the FMA, surveillance measures of bovine
tuberculosis, including on-farm visits and systematic
animal testing, cost the French state as much as 20 million
euros over the period 2010–2011 [39]. In this context, our
analyses suggest that while the risk of epidemic introduc-
tion in France due to contaminated livestock imports
appears limited, the economic risk associated with potential
sanitary bans on French exports is important and could lead
to major market disruptions. This outcome is consistent
with a recent analysis of total-trade flows of livestock
between EU countries [14].
While we build on an already rich literature that applies
network analyses to inform health policies, in particular for
the animal sector, we depart from existing studies by introdu-
cing a market-based categorization to analyse and protect
trade networks propagating epidemics. Our market-basedcategorization, which we have found to be relatively stable
over time, can intuitively describe market structure and inter-
action mechanisms. It can also be used to quantify joint
economic–epidemiological risks, and hence to evaluate pre-
vention strategies that target particular market categories,
thereby concentrating resource application to confined sec-
tors of the system at risk. In particular, when both the
standpoints of the regulator and of the market are taken
into account, we find that preferentially targeting SN,
which are anti-hubs, can, in some cases, outperform the pre-
ferential targeting of WL, i.e. hubs. The preferential targeting
of hubs appears to be systematically more effective when we
only consider the regulator’s point of view and assume that
intervention costs are proportional to the number of econ-
omic agents to be protected. In summary, our study
suggests that multiple perspectives should be adopted
when evaluating targeted preventive strategies, a finding
with general implications for epidemiological and ecological
studies aiming at prioritizing interventions for maintaining
healthy and diverse (eco-)systems.
Achieving the best epidemiological outcome under a con-
strained regulatory budget has been addressed by others, for
example, through optimal control theory [40]. A typical objective
of optimal control theory consists of finding an optimal amount
of treatment at each time step to minimize the total number of
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exceeding a fixed budget. However, prior to the market-centric
analyses introduced here, the influence of epidemics and sub-
sequent regulatory measures on market functioning at the
microeconomic scale were largely unknown [28]. Although we
do not consider here a coupled dynamicmodel of infectious dis-
ease and economics dynamics (as proposed in a recent study
based on theoretical modelling un-parametrized by data [23]),
our study constitutes a first step towards understanding the
likely impacts of epidemics on trade. At the interface between
the data-motivated approach adoptedhere and the proof-of-con-
cept approach exposed in [28], the elaboration of agent-based,
economic–epidemiological models integrating temporal feed-
backs will be the subject of future work. While we have
focused our applications to animal health policy, our empirical
formulation to identify market categories can aid the analysis
of highly complex networks with multiple node types, and
directed, weighted and dynamical links. We believe that the fra-
mework we have proposed can provide wider valuable insights
to uncover the mechanisms underpinning joint disease and
exchange dynamics.
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